Agency theory predicts a negative relationship between risk and incentives, yet recent empirical evidence has not consistently found such a relationship. In fact, some researchers have found a positive relationship. By introducing competition for heterogeneous managers, who differ in their degrees of risk aversion, into a standard agency model, this paper demonstrates that a negative or positive relationship is theoretically possible. Which arises depends on the relative risk aversion parameters of the managers and the absolute and relative riskiness of the environments.
Introduction
In the last decade, a number of authors have sought to empirically test agency theory as developed in Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) . However, as these formulations of the agency problem were very general not many results were forthcoming. As a result, empirical work has often been based on a simple version of the agency problem which can be found in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . In this version, agents have exponential utility and errors are normally distributed. The main prediction of this simple model is that firms that operate in more risky environments offer their managers compensation schemes in which incentives are less intense.
The empirical work that tests this prediction is summarised in Prendergast (1999) and (2002a) . His general conclusion is that "the evidence is hardly overwhelming" for a negative relationship between risk and incentives. For example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) found a significant negative relationship, Garen (1994) found a negative relationship, however, it was statistically insignificant, and Core and Guay (1999) found a statistically significant positive relationship between risk and incentives.
In a recent paper, Prendergast (2000) outlines a number of reasons why one might expect to observe a positive relationship between risk and incentives. These reasons are presented in greater detail in Prendergast (2002a) and (2002b) . In both of these papers the agent is assumed to be risk neutral so risk sharing plays no role in the design of the optimal payment scheme.
In the first paper, monitoring is a substitute for incentive compensation, but is of little value the more uncertain the environment and so is not used in this case. As a result, risk and incentives are positively related. In the second paper, performance evaluations are used to assign workers to the task they are most suited too and to induce effort by workers. These evaluations can be distorted to favour particular workers and cause poor assignment of workers. In an uncertain environment, these evaluations are of little use in efficiently sorting workers and so are used to provide incentives for effort, that is, a positive relationship between the riskiness of the environment and incentives arises naturally.
This paper provides another reason why a positive relationship between risk and incentives might be observed, but unlike Prendergast (2002a Prendergast ( , 2002b , it preserves the risk sharing role of the payment scheme. The crucial factors are the existence of managers with different degrees of risk aversion and competition between firms for these managers. It is less costly for all firms to induce a given action from a less risk averse manager than a more risk averse manager because less has to be paid to compensate the less risk averse manager for the risk he/she bears. Therefore, all firms would like to hire less risk averse managers and compete amongst themselves for their services. Under conditions given in this paper, firms that operate in a more risky environment are prepared to pay more for the services of the less risk averse managers than firms operating in the less risky environment, therefore, competition ensures these less risk averse managers are hired by the riskier firms. Although, ceteris paribus, the more risky the firm the less intense are the incentives, it is also true that the less risk averse the manager the more intense are the incentives. If this latter effect dominates the first, then firms in the riskier environment will be observed to offer compensation scheme which involve more intense incentives than those offered by firms in the less risky environment. As a result, an observed positive relationship between risk and incentives is not inconsistent with agency theory.
Incentives and Risk
A simple model is used to illustrate the trade-off between incentives and risk. The model had its genesis in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , and can be found in Varian (1992) , Gibbons (1998), and Prendergast (1999) The intensity of the incentives provided by the compensation scheme are reflected in β. Let the solution to the firm's problem be denoted by an * , then it is easy to show that
For later reference it is convenient to give the solutions to the firm's problem for α, e, and y
(2)
It should be noted that the participation constraint binds at this solution so the optimal compensation scheme, (α * , β * ), yields the manager reservation utility, U (w).
Heterogeneous Firms and Managers
It is assumed that managers are one of two types, type n or type a. Type n managers are assumed to be less risk averse than type a managers, that is, r n < r a . In addition, it is assumed that there are two types of firms, type h and type l. Type l firms are assumed to operate in a less risky environment
be the solution to the problem of a firm of type j employing a manager of type i.
This follows by direct substitution into (1). Proposition 1 states that firms that operate in less risky environments optimally choose payment schemes with more intense incentives. This result is the negative relationship between risk and incentives that has been the cornerstone of agency theory. Before outlining a reason why a positive relationship may be found, a number of useful results are given.
This follows by direct substitution into (1). As expected, firms of either type provide more intense incentives to managers that are less risk averse than managers that are more risk averse.
This follows by direct substitution into (3). As expected, firms of either type have greater expected net profit if they employ a manager, who is less risk averse, than if they employ a manager, who is more risk averse.
It turns out that the sensitivity of Lemma 2 to firm type is important in the analysis of the next section. Let δ j = y n * j − y a * j measure this sensitivity, it is the difference in net profit that a firm achieves by hiring the less risk averse manager rather than the more risk averse manager. Substitution
Differentiation of δ j with respect to σ 2 j yields a unique positive stationary point at σ 2 c = 1 c √ r a r n . Further differentiation reveals that this stationary point is a maximum. This follows from δ c being a unique maximum. The content of Lemma 3 is that if the riskiness of the environment that both firms face is large, relative to δ c , then hiring the less risk averse manager is more valuable to the firm in the less risky environment than the firm in the more risky environment. On the other hand, if the riskiness of the environment that both firms face is small, relative to δ c , then hiring the less risk averse manager is more valuable to the firm in the more risky environment than the firm in the less risky environment. The intuition is clear. Where the riskiness of the environment is large, incentives are not intense, especially for the relatively more risky environment, therefore, the additional risk associated with the more risky environment is not very costly to the firm and so it does not value the less risk averse manager very highly. On the other hand, where the riskiness of the environment is small, incentives are intense, therefore, even though incentives are less intense in the relatively more risky environment, the additional risk associated with the more risky environment is very costly to the firm and so it values the less risk averse manager very highly.
Competition for Managers
A fact seemed to be ignored by a large part of the agency literature is that firms choose their managers. If some managers are less risk averse than others and it is the more risky firms that hire these managers, then it is possible that these risky firms will have compensation packages with more intense incentives than less risky firms. This possibility is now explored.
It is assumed that there are N managers of type n, A managers of type a, H firms of type h, and L firms of type l. In addition, it is assumed that the number of firms is no greater than the number of potential managers, that is,
This ensures all firms get a manager. Finally, it is assumed that the number of type n managers is less than the total number of firms, that is, N < H + L. These assumptions create an excess demand for type n managers if the four compensation schemes, (α i * j , β i * j ), i = n, a; j = h, l are offered. This excess demand for type n managers arises because, by Lemma 2, all firms have higher profits if they employ an n type manager and N < H +L. Competition for type n managers results in the fixed component of the compensation scheme being bid up until the excess demand for type n managers is eliminated. If it is assumed that δ h > δ l , competition for the n type managers results in the firms in the more risky environment being able to offer n type managers a more attractive compensation scheme and so hiring the less risk averse managers in equilibrium. As a result, the firms in the more risky environment might be observed to offer more intense incentives than firms in the less risky environment.
Proposition 2: It is assumed that all firms observe H and N , σ 2 h and σ 2 l , r a and r n , and that there is competitive bidding for managers, and that 
Proof: Appendix
The excess demand for the more valuable type n manager, which exists if type n managers are offered a compensation scheme which gives then their reservation utility, is eliminated through the firms that employ the less risk averse managers paying them a greater fixed payment. Where H ≤ N, the h type firms and the l type firms that employ type n managers compete with l type firms for their services, therefore, they need only increase the fixed payment by enough to induce them from l type firms, δ l . However, where H > N, the h type firms that employ type n managers compete with other h type firms for their services, therefore, competition between h firms increases the fixed payment by how much more n type managers are worth than a type managers, δ h .
To date it has been implicitly assumed that manager type is observable by firms. However, even if manager type was not observable, Proposition 2 would apply. The proof in the appendix demonstrates that the compensation schemes in Proposition 2 induce self-selection, with type i managers optimally choosing the compensation scheme designed for them. For example, if the three compensation schemes in part (i) of Proposition 2 were offered, type n managers would optimally choose scheme (α n * h + δ l , β n * h ) or (α n * l + δ l , β n * l ) and obtain expected utility of U (w + δ l ) while type a managers would optimally choose scheme (α a * l , β a * l ) and obtain expected utility of U (w).
It should also be noted that although Proposition 2 is derived for the case of two types of managers and two types of firms its general thrust carries naturally over to the case of a finite number of types of managers and firms.
To see this, assume that there are m managers, each of a different type, r i , i = 1, ..., m, and f firms, each of a different type, σ 2 j , j = 1, ..., f . Order the managers so that r 1 < r 2 < .... < r m and order the firms so that , β i * j ).
Proof: Identical in structure to that used to prove Proposition 2.
Given the assumptions, the firm in the riskiest environment employs the least risk averse manager because this manager is worth more to this firm than any other firm. The firm in the second riskiest environment employs the second least risk averse manager, and so on.
A Positive Relationship Between Risk and Incentives
Having established that a competitive equilibrium exists in which h type firms employ some or all of the n type managers and some l type firms always employ a type managers, the following proposition establishes that incentives may be more intense in the high risk environment.
Proposition 3: Assuming competitive bidding for managers and δ h > δ l .
This follows by direct substitution into (1). There are two effects operating on the relationship between the intensity of incentives and the riskiness of the environment. The first is the usual effect given in Proposition 1 that incentives are less intense in the more risky environment, given manager type. The second is the manager allocation effect, where given δ h > δ l , less risk averse managers are employed by the more risky firms. As less risk averse managers are given more intense incentives this second effect results in more intense incentives in the more risky environment. The condition under which the second effect dominates the first is given in Proposition 3.
The manager allocation effect is large the more different are the managers, that is, the greater is r a r n , on the other hand, the effect given in Proposition 1 is small the less different are the firms, that is, the smaller is 
Conclusion
By introducing managers with different degrees of risk aversion and competitive bidding for these managers into a very standard agency model, this paper has demonstrated that a positive relationship between risk and incentives is theoretically possible. Whether or not this positive relationship arises depends on the parameters of the model, in particular, on the relative sizes of the risk aversion parameters of the managers and the relative and absolute sizes of the riskiness of the environment the firms face. The empirical implication of this work and the work of Prendergast (2000a,b) 
